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SOURCES AND EXTENT OF LIABILITY
OF A PUBLIC ACCOUNTANT
WILIAM R. MACMILLAN*
T O what extent a public accountant is liable for failure
to portray through the audit report the true financial
position of the subject is not definitely established. The
reported cases in this country bearing directly on the
subject are few in number. That the public accountant
is a member of a skilled profession is now generally
accepted. In Smith v. London Assurance Corporation,'
the Supreme Court of New York said, ". . . public
accountants now constitute a skilled professional class,
and are subject generally to the same rules for liability
for negligence in the practice of their profession as are
the members of other skilled professions. And such is
doubtless the law."
Every man who offers his services to another and is
employed assumes the duty to exercise in the employment
such skill as he possesses with reasonable care and dili-
gence. In all those employments where peculiar skill is
requisite, if one offers his services, he is understood as
holding himself out to the public as possessing the degree
of skill commonly possessed by others in the same em-
ployment and, if his pretensions are unfounded, he
*Member of Illinois Bar; alumnus of Chicago-Kent College of Law.
96 N. Y. S. 820 (1905).
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commits a specie of fraud upon every man that employs
him in reliance on his public profession. 2
Public accountants hold themselves out to be skilled
and competent to perform the duties and services which
they undertake to perform as accountants, and are bound
by law to perform such services in a skillful manner.
When accountants are employed for the purpose of
auditing the books and accounts they occupy a position
of trust and confidence to their employer based on their
superior knowledge of the business of accounting pos-
sessed by accountants. 3 An accountant, however, is not
bound to do more than exercise reasonable care and skill
in making inquiries and investigations. He is not an
insurer; he does not guarantee that the books do correctly
show the true position of the subject's affairs; he does
not even guarantee that the balance sheet is accurate
according to the books of the company. If he did he would
be responsible for error on his part even if he were him-
self deceived without any want of reasonable care.4 He
undertakes for good faith and integrity and is liable to
his employer for negligence, bad faith, or dishonesty.
For the purpose of the analysis of the liability with
which the public accountant may be charged, it may be
well to consider separately the cases wherein the gist of
the action is negligence and the cases predicated upon
fraud. Since the negligence and the contractual theories
are inter-related they will be treated together.
In order for the accountant to be liable on the theory
of negligence he must owe a duty to the party who seeks
to hold him liable. If he owes no duty he cannot be
required to respond in damages no matter how negligent
he may have been and no matter what damage the other
2 3 Cooley on Torts (4th ed.) 335, sec. 472.
3 Dantzler Lumber & Export Co. v. Columbia Casualty Co., 115 Fla. 541,
156 So. 116, 95 A. L. R. 258 (1934).
4 Leeds Estate, Building and Investment Co. v. Shepherd, 36 Ch. Div. 787
(1887).
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party may have sustained., The contract of employment
ordinarily -supplies the duty necessary to form a basis for
the action.
Negligence may be defined as the failure to observe for
the protection of the interests of another person that
degree of skill, care, and caution which the circumstances
justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury.
In every case involving actionable negligence there are
necessarily three basic elements essential to its existence:
1. The existence of a duty on the part of the defend-
ant to protect the plaintiff from the injury.
2. The failure of the defendant to perform that duty.
3. An injury to the plaintiff from such failure of the
defendant."
Where the duty arises out of contract, the injured
party has alternative remedies, one for the breach of the
contract and the other in tort for negligence. Accom-
panying every contract is a common law duty to perform
the thing agreed to be done with reasonable care, skill,
and caution, and a negligence failure to observe these
conditions is a tort as well as a breach of the contract.
If the transaction complained of had its origin in con-
tract which placed the parties in such a relation that in
attempting to perform the promised service the tort was
committed, then the breach of the contract is not neces-
sarily the gravamen of the suit. The contract in such
case may be considered merely as creating the state of
things which furnishes the occasion for the tort. For
injuries resulting from unskillful or otherwise negligent
performance of a thing agreed by a valid contract to be
done, an action ex delicto will lie notwithstanding the act
5 Landell v. Lybrand, 264 Pa. 406, 107 A. 783, 8 A. L. R. 461 (1919) ; Ultra
Mares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N. Y. 170, 174 N. E. 441, 74 A. L. R. 1139 (1931).
6 Tampa Electric Co. v. Bazemore, 85 Fla. 164, 96 So. 297 (1923).
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complained of would also be ground for an action ex
contractu.
The skill that he must use in the performance of an
audit must be that which he purported to have by holding
himself out as a public accountant. By making the con-
tract of employment he impliedly warrants that he has
the degree of skill that is generally possessed by others
in the same calling. What is reasonable care and caution
must necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances
of each case. The Circuit Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit in George N. Pierce Company v. Wells
Fargo & Company, commenting on the care a common
carrier is bound to exercise, said: "Greater care is called
for in transporting eggs than in transporting pig iron.'"
Where the scope of the audit has been limited by con-
tract, it cannot be supposed the auditors will take the
same precautions to uncover irregularities as they would
in the case of a detailed audit. In International Labor-
atories, Ltd. v. Dewar,9 the defendants, chartered ac-
countants, had been employed to make a balance sheet
audit. A more complete audit had been dispensed with to
save money. The action was to recover for the losses
which resulted to the plaintiff company through the
alleged negligence of the auditors in failing to discover
and report the defalcations of the office manager. The
principal point in issue was whether or not the auditors
were liable for negligence in view of the fact that the
plaintiff, by contract with them, had so limited the scope
of their audit that it was practically impossible for the
auditors to uncover the defalcations. The court held that
the auditors were not negligent in performing their work
7 26 R. C. L. 758; Barrett v. New Eng. Tel. & Tel. Co., 80 N. H. 354, 117
A. 264, 23 A. L. R. 947 (1922).
8 189 F. 561 (1911).
9 41 Manitoba L. R. 329 (1933).
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because the measure of responsibility depended on the
terms of their employment.10
An auditor is not bound to be a detective, or approach
his work with suspicion, or with a foregone conclusion
that there is something wrong. In In re Kingston Cotton
Mill Company (No. 2), 11 Lopes, L. J., said:
He is a watch-dog, but not a bloodhound. He is justified in
believing tried servants of the company in whom confidence is
placed by the company. He is entitled to assume that they are
honest, and to rely upon their representations, provided he takes
reasonable care. If there is anything calculated to excite sus-
picion, he should probe it to the bottom; but in the absence
of anything of that kind, he is only bound to be reasonably
cautious and careful.
Unless the contract of employment so provides, he is not
required to take inventory. Where there is nothing to
excite his suspicion he is justified in assuming that the
one taken by the agents of the employer is fair and made
without fraud. It was held, therefore, in In re Kingston
Cotton Mill Company (No. 2) that the auditors were not
negligent in using in the preparation of their statements
the inventory furnished them by their employer even
though it subsequently turned out that it was grossly
misstated.
The accountants were held not negligent in the per-
formance of their audit in Blue Band Navigation Com-
pany v. Price Waterhouse2 where they omitted to inves-
tigate an amount owing to the plaintiff company by a
third party syndicate, relying instead on the personal
guaranty of the managing director. The defendant
auditors, when auditing the company's books, questioned
him concerning the amount owing to the company by
the syndicate. He refused to disclose its personnel or the
nature of its business except that it was engaged in
10 The dissenting opinion was based not on the principle involved, but on
what the parties understood the extent of the audit should be.
11 [1896] 2 Ch. Div. 279, 65 L. J. Ch. 673, 74 L. T. R. 568.
12 [1934] 3 D. L. R. 404, 48 Brit. Col. R. 325, 15 Can. Bankr. Rep. 434.
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speculative ventures in the stock market, but he gave
a personal written guaranty of the amount to the com-
pany. The auditors, who knew the managing director at
the time to be very wealthy, accepted the guaranty as
sufficient security for the purpose of the audit. Although
they set the guaranty out in full in their report to the
company, the details relating to its being given were not
mentioned.
The accountants were held to be negligent in Fox &
Son v. Moorish Grant & Company," where, over a num-
ber of years, they audited the books of the plaintiff
company and stated the amount of cash in the bank as it
appeared in the books without examining the bank pass
book, or obtaining any statement with reference thereto
from the bank, or informing the firm that they had not
done so. The entries in the books of account were in fact
falsely made by a dishonest clerk of the plaintiff whose
defalcations would have been discovered if the entries
had been checked with reference to the pass book.
Proof of negligence on the part of the accountant and
an injury to the employer does not in itself establish a
cause of action. There must be a causal connection be-
tween the negligent act or omission and the injury sought
to be redressed. To make one liable on the theory of
negligence, therefore, the plaintiff must not only allege
and prove negligence on the part of the defendant, but
must also allege and prove that the negligence of the
defendant was the cause of the injury complained of. It
is not sufficient to show that the negligence of the
defendant and the injury to the plaintiff concurred. 14 No
matter how obvious the causal relation may be, it will not
be presumed.5 The plaintiff municipal corporation in
County of Renfrew v. Lockhart 6 sought to recover from
'3 35 T. L. R. 126, 36 Sol. Jo. 193 (1918).
14 Sowles v. Moore et al., 65 Vt. 322, 26 A. 629 (1893).
15 Aiken v. City of Columbus, 167 Ind. 139, 78 N. E. 657 (1906).
16 [1933] Ont. Week. N. 627.
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the defendant auditors $117,902 embezzled by one Biggs
while acting as county treasurer from 1925 to 1931. Dur-
ing that time the defendants, who had been employed to
audit the books of the treasurer's office failed to detect
and report any irregularity. The accountants did not
compare the cash book with the entries in the bank book
as carefully as they might have done. Instead they took
the balance in the cash book at the end of the year and
compared it with the balance shown in the bank book and
found these were in general correspondence. The plain-
tiff did not allege, nor prove that the injury resulted to
it through any act or omission of the auditors. In affirm-
ing the decision of the trial court, the reviewing court
said, "Here, there is no evidence of actual damage to the
plaintiff, the corporation, flowing from the failure of the
defendant to discover and report the defalcations on the
part of Biggs. Were they guilty of breach of duty? That
is not sufficient. There must be damages flowing from
the breach, and there is nothing to show any damage
was sustained by the plaintiff owing to the failure of the
defendants to report the defalcations."
Want of due care on the part of the party injured may
also preclude recovery for the negligent acts of the
defendant. The defendant's wrong is not considered the
proximate cause of the injury where the plaintiff has
been guilty of some fault concurrent with, or subsequent
to that of the defendant, without which the injury would
not have happened. 7 In Craig v. Anyon 8 it was held
that the plaintiffs, stock and commodity brokers, could
not recover for the negligence of the defendant auditors
in failing to discover and report the defalcations of one
Moore, an employee of the plaintiffs, as it was found that
the loss resulted also from the negligent manner in which
the brokers conducted their business. Moore had been
17 Lea v. Southern Public Utilities, 176 N. C. 511, 97 S. E. 492 (1918)
Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Davis, 75 F. (2d) 849 (1935).
18 208 N. Y. S. 259 (1925).
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given full charge of the commodities department and had
a free hand in making the entries in the books of account
and in the handling of contracts. Although the defendants
cautioned the brokers about providing a system of in-
ternal check, the brokers failed to do so. From 1913 to
1917 Moore embezzled $1,250,000 of the company's funds.
Every three months during that time the defendants
audited the books of the plaintiff company and their
reports, without making reference to any irregularity,
assured the plaintiffs that the books were properly kept.
The accountants, as well as the plaintiffs relied on the
honesty of the defaulting employee. The court said,
"There is no doubt in this case that the plaintiff could
have prevented loss by the exercise of reasonable care
and they should not have relied exclusively on the
accountants." This conclusion was reached even though
the defendants could have performed the work inde-
pendently of the information furnished by the employee.
Not all negligent acts of the plaintiff, however, will bar a
recovery. In order to defeat recovery, the negligence of
the plaintiff must be of a character that the injury com-
plained of would not have occurred but for such act or
omission. An act or omission that merely increases or
adds to the extent of the loss or injury does not preclude
the plaintiff's right to recover, although it may affect the
amount of damages to be recovered in a given case.19
It is a general rule that one who asserts that another
party is negligent has the burden of proving it when such
negligence is in issue.20 There is some authority for the
view that proof of a contract or undertaking and damage
resulting from a breach make out a prima facie case.2'
Following the latter line of thought, Astbury, J., speaking
for the court in In re Republic of Bolivia Exploration
Syndicate (No. 2)22 said, "I think when it is shown that
19 Smithwick v. Hall & Upson Co., 59 Conn. 261, 21 A. 924 (1890).
20 Chicago Union Traction Co. v. Giese, 229 Ill. 260, 82 N. E. 232 (1907).
21 1 Shearman & Redfield on Negligence (6th ed.) 122, 134, secs. 57 and 60.
22 83 L. J. Ch. 235 (1913).
LIABILITIES OF A PUBLIC ACCOUNTANT
audited balance sheets do not shew the true condition
of the company, and damage has resulted, the onus is on
the auditors to shew that it was not the result of any
breach of duty on their part."
Where a case of negligence is made out against the
accountant, he must respond for all damages that flow
proximately from the breach of duty.23 He is not liable
for all irregularities, but he is responsible for losses that
result to his client through his failure to report such
irregularities as would be discovered by the exercise of
reasonable care and skill. Thus in Fox & Son v. Moorish
Grant & Company,24 the accountants, who had negligently
failed to detect and report the defalcations of an em-
ployee extending over a period of years, were required
to reimburse their client for the losses that could have
been averted had they performed their duty with care
and skill. When the accountant reports the irregularities,
the employer is enabled to take proper steps to avoid a
repetition. If, as a natural consequence of the auditor's
breach of duty, payments are made which are a mis-
application of the company's funds, the auditors are
responsible.2 5 To come within the sphere of recovery,
however, the loss must be the natural consequence of the
breach of duty, or could have been foreseen as the prob-
able result of it as distinguished from remote and specu-
lative damages.26
Hadley v. Baxendale27 is the leading case pertaining
to damages that result from the breach of contract and
the rule laid down therein is generally followed in this
country.2" The court in that case said:
23 Smith v. London Assurance Co., 96 N. Y. S. 820 (1905).
24 35 T. L. R. 126, 36 Sol. Jo. 193 (1918).
25 Leeds Estate Building & Investment Co. v. Shepherd, 36 Ch. Div. 787
(1887).
28 City of East Grand Forks v. Steele, 121 Minn. 296, 141 N. W. 181, 45
L. R. A. (N. S.) 205 (1913).
27 9 Exch. 341, 23 L. J. Exch. 179, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).
28 Illinois Central R. R. v. Cobb Christy Co., 64 Ill. 128 (1872) ; Ecking-
ton & Soldiers' Home Railway Co. v. McDevitt, 191 U. S. 103, 48 L. Ed. 112
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Now we think the proper rule ... is this: Where two parties
have made a contract which one of them has broken, the damages
which the other party ought to receive in respect to such breach
of contract should be such as may fairly and reasonably be
considered either arising naturally, i.e., according to the usual
course of things, from such breach of contract itself, or such
as may reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation
of both parties, at the time they made the contract, as the
probable result of the breach of it. Now, if the special circum-
stances under which the contract was actually made were com-
municated by the plaintiffs to the defendants, and thus known to
both parties, the damages resulting from the breach of such a
contract, which they reasonably contemplate would be the
amount of injury which would ordinarily follow from a breach
of contract under these special circumstances so known and
communicated.
The rule in Hadley v. Baxendale was followed by the
Supreme Court of Minnesota in City of East Grand
Forks v. Steele.2 9 The plaintiff city had hired the def end-
ants, public accountants, for two years to make an audit
of the books of the city clerk. During both years the
clerk embezzled several thousand dollars of the city's
funds. The evidence showed that the defendants failed
to discover the defalcations because of incompetence and
negligence. Had the defendants discovered the defalca-
tions in the first audit, recovery could have been had
from the surety on the clerk's fidelity bond and the losses
could have been averted the second year, had the facts
been known, by removing the clerk for misconduct in
office. During his second year in office, the surety com-
pany became insolvent. The city declared both in con-
tract and in tort for negligence, but the court held that
(1903) ; Chapman v. Fargo, 223 N. Y. 32, 119 N. E. 76 (1918) ; Altschuler v.
Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 155 Wis. 146, 144 N. W. 294 (1913);
Miholevich v. Mid-West Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 261 Mich. 495, 246 N. W. 202,
86 A. L. R. 633 (1933) ; Shopper Pub. Co. v. Skat Co., 90 Conn. 317, 97 A.
317 (1916); Dondis v. Borden, 230 Mass. 73, 119 N. E. 184 (1918); De
Honey v. Gjarde, 134 Wash. 647, 236 P. 290 (1925) ; Alabama Water Service
Co. v. Wakefield, 231 Ala. 112, 163 So. 626 (1935).
29 121 Minn. 296, 141 N. W. 181, 45 L. R. A. (N. S.) 205 (1913).
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the plaintiff had stated but one cause of action and that
was on the contract. The damages prayed for were the
sums embezzled each of the two years and the fees that
were paid the defendants for their services. Recovery was
not permitted for the defalcations because it was not
shown that these were in the contemplation of the parties
at the time of making the contract, or that the losses may
reasonably have been expected from the breach. The
city was allowed to recover on the theory of a breach
of warranty for the fees that were paid to the defendants.
On this point the court said, "In accepting employment
as expert accountants, they undertook, and the plaintiff
had the right to expect, that in the performance of their
duties they would exercise the average ability and skill
of those engaged in that branch of skilled labor." Had it
been shown that it was within the contemplation of the
parties that losses might ensue from future embezzle-
ments if the accountants failed to detect them, or had
the accountants been apprised that the purpose of the
audit was to guard against such loss, the language of the
court would indicate that the accountants would have
been liable for the losses that could have been averted by
properly performing their contract.
As far as the extent of recovery is concerned in a suit
between the parties to the contract, it makes no difference
whether the action be in tort for negligence, or whether
it be founded on the breach of contract.3 0 The underlying
principles governing an award of damages are the same
whether the action is in contract or in tort arising from
contract.3 In all civil actions the law gives, or endeavors
to give, a just indemnity for the wrong that has been
done to the plaintiff, and whether the act was of the kind
designated as a tort or one consisting of breach of con-
30 Thompson v. Clemens, 96 Md. 196, 53 A. 919, 60 L. R. A. 580 (1903).
3' 17 C. J. 717, and cases there cited.
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tract, is, on the question of damages, an irrelevant
inquiry.32
A third theory on which an accountant may be charged
with liability is fraud and deceit. Accountants in making
an audit, owe to their employer a duty imposed by law to
make their audit without fraud." Fraud or deceit is the
false representation or concealment of a material fact,
made with knowledge that it is false, or recklessly made
without regard to its truth, intended to be relied upon by
another, and which is in fact reasonably relied upon by
that other to his damage.8
The accountants were found to be guilty of fraud in
Canadian Woodmen of the World v. Hooper35 An em-
ployee of the plaintiff company had been provided with
funds and instructed by the board of directors to buy
Grand Trunk Railway bonds, but instead of buying the
bonds, he purchased a mortgage on a skating rink. The
employee not only failed to report to the directorate what
he had done, but concealed the fact from them by false
entries in the company's books by showing that the
investment in railway bonds had been made. The trans-
action was carried on the company's books without any
discovery of the true state of affairs except by the
defendants, public accountants. They found out what had
taken place and yet they made no report to the direc-
torate, nor to any official of the plaintiff company other
than the defaulting employee who had promised to have
the matter put right. The auditors' report for 1927,
1928, and 1929 showed the railway bonds as an invest-
ment and each report was accompanied with the certifi-
cate: "The bonds, debentures, and mortgages have been
82 Hetzel v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co., 169 U. S. 26, 42 L. Ed. 648
(1898).
33 Ultra Mares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N. Y. 170, -174 N. E. 441 (1931).
34 Pain v. Kiel, 288 F. 527 (1923); Billstrom v. Tripple Tread Tire Co.,
220 IIl. App. 550 (1921).
35 41 Ont. Week. N. 328 (1932), [1933] 1 D. L. R. 168.
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examined by us and are according to the list annexed
hereto." The auditors did not disclose the true facts to
the plaintiff until March 3, 1931. The court in speaking
of the accountants said, "Their liability depends on a
positive act amounting to misconduct in the office of
auditor. Upon discovery of the so-called irregularity, it
was the auditors' duty to report at once the true facts
to the company." Although they were not responsible for
the conduct of the defaulting employee, they were found
to be liable for any loss which resulted from their failure
to report the true facts to the plaintiff at the time they
acquired the information.
To be actionable fraud, the statement need not be made
with the intent to deceive. Where a party represents a
material fact to be true of his own personal knowledge,
as distinguished from belief or opinion, when he does
not know whether it is true or not, and it is actually
untrue, he is guilty of falsehood even though he believed
it to be true. If the statement is made with the intention
that it should be relied upon by another who does so act
upon it to his injury, the result is actionable fraud.3 6 If
fraud is proved, the motive of the person guilty is
immaterial.3 7
Although it was not shown in Ultra Mares Corporation
v. Touche38 that the accountants intended to deceive any-
one, they were, nevertheless, found guilty of fraud. They
certified as a fact, true of their own knowledge, that the
balance sheet was in accordance with the books of ac-
count. 9 The balance sheet may be summarized as follows:
36 Owens v. Waterhouse, 233 N. Y. S. 535 (1929) ; Bystrom v. Villard,
162 N. Y. S. 100 (1916).
37 Derry v. Peek, 14 App. Cas. 337 (1889).
38 255 N. Y. 170, 174 N. E. 441, 74 A. L. R. 1139 (1931).
39 To the balance sheet was appended the following certificates: "We have
examined the accounts of Fred Stern & Co., Inc., for the year ending
December 31, 1923, and hereby certify that the annexed balance sheet is in
accordance therewith and with the information and explanations given us.
We further certify that, subject to provision for federal taxes on income, the
said statement, in our opinion, presents a true and correct view of the
financial condition of Fred Stern & Co., Inc., as at December 31, 1923."
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Assets $2,550,671.88 Liabilities $1,479,956.62
Net Worth 1,070,715.26
$2,550,671.88 $2,550,671.88
In reality, the capital and surplus accounts had been
wiped out and the corporation was insolvent. The books
had been falsified by those in charge of the business so
as to set forth accounts receivable and other assets which
turned out to be fictitious. Inquiries of creditors gave
notice to the accountants that some of the assets had
been pledged at as many as four different banks at the
same time. An item amounting to more than $700,000
which represented the sales for the month of December
was taken as true, where there were not supporting
entries, without examining the invoices. If there was not
an intentional misrepresentation, it amounted to what is
sometimes called reckless indifference. It amounts to
knowledge of the falsity, because it excludes any possibil-
ity of real belief in the truth of the fact stated.4" To pre-
vent a false statement from being fraudulent, there must
always be an honest belief in the truth.4 If there has
been neither reckless misstatement, nor insincere pro-
fession of an opinion, but only an honest blunder, the
ensuing liability is for negligence.4"
One is not relieved of liability for fraud because his
statements were ambiguous and in a sense true, if they
were calculated to mislead. Speaking of an equivocal
prospectus, which was condemned as fraudulent by the
House of Lords in Aaron's Reefs, Ltd. v. Twiss, 48 Lord
Halsbury called the language ambidexterous. In the case
it was argued that no specific allegation of fact was
proved to be false. The Lord Chancellor protested against
this being the true test, and declared the question was
40 Owens v. Waterhouse, 233 N. Y. S. 535 (1929).
41 Derry v. Peek, 14 App. Cas. 337 (1889).
42 Ultra Mares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N. Y. 170, 174 N. E. 441 (1931).
43 [1896] A. C. 273.
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whether taking the whole thing together, there was a
false representation.
I do not care by what means it is conveyed-by what trick or
device or ambiguous language: all those are expedients by which
fraudulent people seem to think they can escape the real
substance of the transaction. If by a number of statements you
intentionally give a false impression and induce a person to
act upon it, it is not the less false although if one takes each
statement by itself there may be difficulty in showing that any
specific statement is untrue.
In In re London and General Bank (No. 2),44 a suit by
the liquidator of an insolvent corporation, the auditors
were held liable for two semi-annual dividends paid while
the corporation was insolvent, because they had failed to
discharge the duty imposed by statute4 5 to report to both
the directors and stockholders the financial position of
the company. As the stockholders were required to con-
cur in the declaring of a dividend, it was necessary that
they be apprised of the company's condition. The most
important asset on the balance sheet was "Loans to
customers and other securities" £346,975. The evidence
showed that the defendant auditors were aware of the
precarious condition of the investments and that the com-
pany was in fact insolvent. The report to the directors as
originally drawn concluded with the observation, "We
cannot conclude without expressing our opinion unhesi-
tatingly that no dividend should be paid this year." The
auditors, however, were persuaded by the chairman of
the company to strike the sentence from their report. The
certificate signed by the auditors and laid before the
shareholders at their annual meeting was as follows:
"We have examined the above balance-sheet and compared
it with the books of the company; and we certify that it
is a correct summary of the accounts therein recorded.
The value of the assets as shewn on the balance sheet is
44 [1895] 2 Ch. Div. 673.
45 Companies Act (Eng.) 1877, sec. 7.
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dependent upon realization." It was contended by the
auditors that they were only required to certify that the
balance sheet was correctly drawn from the books of the
company. They further maintained that they did in fact
warn the stockholders of the necessity of inquiring into
the sufficiency of the securities by appending a note to
their report to the effect that the value of the securities
depended on realization. The court held the defendants'
contentions to be untenable and that it is the duty of the
accountant, by examining the books of the company, to
ascertain and state its true financial position at the time
of the audit. In commenting further the court said,
... he does not discharge his duty by doing this without inquiry
and without taking any trouble to see that the books themselves
shew the company's true position. He must take reasonable
care to ascertain that they do so. Unless he does this his audit
would be an idle farce .... A person whose duty it is to convey
information to others does not discharge that duty by simply
giving them so much information as is calculated to induce
them, or some of them, to ask for more.
One who has been wronged by the fraud and deceit of
another is entitled to reparation for the injuries that
have been occasioned thereby. Usually the defendant is
compelled to respond in such damages as will place the
plaintiff where he would have been if the wrong had
never been committed.46 As fraud is considered an
intentional wrong, the liability of the perpetrator is abso-
lute. When a case of fraud is made out against the
defendant, he is liable for the consequences and it does
not matter whether or not the injury complained of was
within the contemplation of the parties at the time of
the occurrence of the transaction; or if it could have been
foreseen by the defendant; or if the injury was the nat-
ural and probable result of the fraudulent misrepresenta-
tion; or if the plaintiff was himself negligent.
It has been previously pointed out that the accountant
46 Bauer on Damages, pp. 388-9, sec. 225.
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must owe a duty to the party who seeks to hold him liable
for negligence in order that he be liable on that ground.
As the duty to use care and skill in the performance of
the audit grows out of the contractual relationship, it
follows that he would not be required to account on that
basis to a stranger to the contract. This, undoubtedly, is
the general rule. It has been frequently laid down as a
principle of law that no cause of action for negligence
can arise out of the breach of a duty existing by virtue
of a contract unless there be a privity of contract between
the parties.47 In the absence of fraud or collusion, a per-
son making a certificate is liable, ordinarily, only to his
employer for negligent errors or omissions therein.48
In Landell v. Lybrand4 1 the plaintiff, third party
stranger to the contract, in reliance on the defendants'
audit report, invested in shares of stock of the subject
company. The report was erroneous and he thereby suf-
fered a loss which he sought to recover from the account-
ants. The averment in the statement of claim was that
the defendants were negligent in making their report. It
was held that even though they were careless in the
performance of the audit, the plaintiff failed to state a
47 20 R. C. L. 49, note 7.
48 An engineering firm, whose business was to test building materials,
inspected a quantity of steel rails for the owner and rendered a report
thereon concerning their quality. The report was erroneous. It was held
that the plaintiff, who purchased the rails in reliance on the report, had no
cause of action against the engineers who made the false report. National
Iron & Steel v. Hunt, 312 Ill. 245, 143 N. E. 833, 34 A. L. R. 63 (1924).
An expert grain inspector certified to a mill that certain wheat was grade
No. 1 red winter wheat, when in fact it was inferior grade. The mill sold
the wheat to the plaintiff, and he, relying on the certificate of inspection paid
for the wheat without examining it. It was held that the plaintiff could not
recover damages from the inspector for the reason that the latter owed him
no legal duty. Gordon v. Livingston, 12 Mo. App. 267 (1882).
An attorney, employed to draw a will, was held not liable to a person, who
through the attorney's neglect, or ignorance, in the discharge of his pro-
fessional duties, had been deprived of a portion of the estate the testator
instructed should be given by his will. The basis of the decision was that
there was no privity between the attorney and the disappointed beneficiary.
Buckley v. Gray, 110 Cal. 339, 42 P. 900 (1895). As to the third parties
who relied on certificates of title to real property, see National Savings Bank
v. Ward, 100 U. S. 195, 25 L. Ed. 621 (1880) and Thomas v. Guaranty Title
& Trust, 81 Ohio St. 432, 91 N. E. -183 (1910).
4 264 Pa. 406, 107 A. 783, 8 A. L. R. 461 (1919).
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cause of action because he had not shown that the ac-
countants owed him a duty. It was similarly held in
Ultra Mares Corporation v. Touche that the plaintiff,
which had advanced credit in reliance on a certified bal-
ance sheet, stated no cause of action for negligence.
Although the question does not seem to have arisen
in any reported case involving the liability of an
accountant, analogous cases would lead one to believe
that where the audit is made at the instance of the sub-
ject company for the benefit of a third party, and it can
be shown that the auditor knew the purpose for which it
was intended, there is a duty owing to that third party
for the breach of which the auditor must respond in
damages. If one, who is in the business of preparing
abstracts of title to real estate, is employed by a propri-
etor to prepare an abstract for another's benefit, and if
he knows the person to whom it will be delivered and
knows that he will act on it in making a purchase or
trade, he is liable to such person for want of care or
skill in its preparation.50 The same principle was involved
in Glanzer v. Shepard,51 where the defendants, public
weighers, were requested by the seller to weigh a quan-
tity of beans and make duplicate return thereon, one copy
to the seller and the other to the buyer. The plaintiff-
buyer, who, in reliance on the report which turned out
to be erroneous, overpaid the seller, was allowed to
recover the loss occasioned through the negligence of the
defendants.
The doctrine of Lawrence v. Fox,52 the principle which
permits a third person to maintain an action on a contract
made between other persons for his benefit, has been
50 Anderson v. Spriestersbach, 69 Wash. 393, 125 P. 166 (1912) ; Denton
v. Nashville Title Co., 112 Tenn. 320, 79 S. W. 799 (1904) ; Western Loan
& Savings Co. v. Silver Bow Abstract Co., 31 Mont. 448, 78 P. 774 (1904) ;
Economy Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. West Jersey Title & Guar. Co., 64 N. J.
L. 27, 44 A. 854 (1899).
51 233 N. Y. 236, 135 N. E. 275 (1922).
52 20 N. Y. 268 (1859).
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gradually expanding until today the beneficiary of a
promise, clearly designated as such is seldom without a
remedy.3 In order to maintain an action as a third party
beneficiary for the breach of an agreement, the plaintiff
should show that the agreement was intended for his
direct benefit.54 Ordinarily something more must appear
than that the promise shall redound to the benefit of the
public or that of a class of indefinite extension.15 In a
few jurisdictions it is held that if a third party, even
though unknown at the time of making the contract, is
necessarily to be benefited by the performance of the con-
tract, he has a remedy for its breach if he thereby suffers
injury.5 6 It appears, however, that in cases where a third
party has been permitted to recover for the breach of
a duty in making a certificate, he has been required to
show that the agreement was made for his special benefit.
In any instance where a third person may maintain a
tort action for negligence for the breach of a duty arising
out of a contractual relationship, he may also, on the doc-
trine of Lawrence v. Fox have a recovery for his injury in
an action based on the contract itself.57
Where the theory of the cause of action is fraud and
deceit, it is neither necessary to show a privity of con-
tract, nor that the contract was made for the plaintiff's
benefit. All that is essential is that it was intended that
the injured party should rely on the false statement and
that he did rely on it to his damage. The fraudulent rep-
resentations which form the basis of the action may be
53 Seaver v. Ransom, 24 N. Y. 233, 120 N. E. 639, 2 A. L. R. 1187 (1918).
See also 81 A. L. R. 1271, note.
54 Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 75 F.. (2d) 596(1935); Kenfield Pub. Co. v. Baumgartner, 189 Ill. App. 413 (1914).
55 H. R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 247 N. Y. 160; 159 N. E:
896, 62 A. L. R. 1199 (1928).
56 Ohio Casualty Ins. Co. v. Beckwith, 74 F. (2d) 75 (1934) ; Binswanger
v. Employers' Liability Assurance Corp., 224 Mo. App. 1025, 28 S. W. (2d)
448 (1930); Gorell v. Greensboro Water-Supply Co., 124 N. C. 328, 32
S. E. 720 (1899).
57 Economy Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. West Jersey Title & Guarantee Co.,
64 N. J. L. 27, 44 A. 854 (1899).
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made to an individual, or may be made to the public gen-
erally if the intent is that the ones to whom the informa-
tion is communicated will rely on it.58 To create a cause
of action for fraud, it is not necessary that the deceit
should have been practiced directly on the plaintiff, but
it is sufficient if the initial fraud which was intended to
injure the plaintiff caused him damage through inter-
mediate agencies. 59
In Ultra Mares Corporation v. Touche, the subject
company was engaged in the sale of rubber, and in financ-
ing its operations it required extensive credit and bor-
rowed large sums of money from banks and other lend-
ers. All this was known to the defendant accountants.
They were also aware that in the usual course of busi-
ness, the balance sheets, when certified, would be exhibited
by the subject company to banks, creditors, stockholders,
purchasers, or sellers, according to the needs of the
occasion as a basis of financial dealings. Accordingly,
when the balance sheet was made up, the defendants sup-
plied the subject company with thirty-two copies, certified
with serial numbers, as counterpart originals. Nothing
was said as to whom these counterpar would be shovn,
or the extent or number of transactions in which they
would be used. In particular, there was no mention of
the plaintiff, which until then, had never extended credit
to the subject company. The defendants were, neverthe-
less, liable for the loss sustained by the plaintiff on ac-
count of advances made in reliance on the false statement
certified by the defendants and placed in its hands
through the medium of the subject company.
The accountant may also be liable to one other than
the employer on the theory of subrogation. That is the
equity by which a person who is secondarily liable for
58 Ver Wys v. Vander Mey, 206 Mich. 499, 173 N. W. 504 (1919);
Leonard v. Springer, 197 Ill. 532, 64 N. E. 299 (1902).
59 Cooper v. Weissblatt, 277 N. Y. S. 709 (1935).
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a debt, and has paid it, is put in the place of the creditor
so as to entitle him to make use of all the securities and
remedies possessed by the creditor in order to enforce
the right of exoneration against the principal debtor.60
No new cause of action is created, nor additional rights
afforded under this theory. It is merely a transfer to a
third party of the right the employer had to maintain
an action against the accountant for negligence or fraud
in making the audit. In Dantzler Lumber & Export Com-
pany v. Columbia Casualty Company,61 the plaintiff was
required to make good to the employer the losses it had
sustained through the defalcations of a dishonest em-
ployee because it was surety on the defaulting employee's
fidelity bond. In that action it was held that the plaintiff
was entitled to be subrogated to the rights of the subject
company to be indemnified for the injuries it had sus-
tained as a result of the negligence and fraud of the
auditors in making their audit and report. As the one
subrogated stands in the position of the employer, the
principles which apply are those relating to accountant
and employer and not those of accountant and third per-
sons.
It is possible that an accountant may be liable to his
client for disclosing to another, or using for his own
benefit confidential information he has acquired in the
course of his employment. When accountants are em-
ployed for the purpose of auditing books and accounts,
they occupy a position of trust and confidence. For a
successful audit to be made, the accountant should have
free access to the books of account, customer's lists, mem-
oranda, and minutes of the meetings of the board of
directors. In examining files and records in the perform-
ance of the audit, he is in position to acquire knowledge
60 Black's Law Dictionary.
61 115 Fla. 541, 156 So. 116, 95 A. L. R. 258 (1934).
62 Dantzler Lumber & Export Co. v. Columbia Casualty Co., 115 Fla. 541,
156 So. 116 (1934).
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of trade secrets and other information, which, if placed
in the hands of a competitor, would be damaging to the
client. To permit the accountant to use for his own
benefit, or for the benefit of another in competition with
his employer, information so acquired would destroy the
freedom of communication that should exist. It is against
public policy to allow persons occupying fiduciary rela-
tions to be placed in positions in which there will be
constant danger of betrayal of trusts by selfish motives.6 3
The accountant occupies a position similar to that of a
confidential agent and it seems logical that the same duty
of loyalty that an agent owes to his principal inheres in
the relation between the accountant and his client. It is
stated in the Restatement of the Law of Agency: "Thus,
an agent who is told by the principal of his plans, or who
secretly examines books or memoranda of the employer,
is not privileged to use such information at his prin-
cipal's expense. '64
One who has made wrongful use of confidential infor-
mation acquired in the course of his employment may be
forced to indemnify the party wronged by an action at
a rthoa implied contract o Lu ivulge,
or may be required to account in a court of equity for
profits derived from the wrongful use. The wrongdoer
may be enjoined from committing threatened or con-
tinued disclosure of his employer's secrets. Justice Story
in his work on equity jurisprudence, 5 said, "Courts of
equity will restrain a party from making a disclosure of
secrets communicated to him in the course of a confiden-
tial employment, and it matters not in such cases whether
they are secrets of trade or secrets of title, or any other
secrets important to his interests."
An attempt has been made here to point out the sources
63 25 C. J. 1120.
64 Sec. 395, comment.
65 2 Story's Eq. Juris. (13th ed.), sec. 952.
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and extent of liability of the public accountant in his rela-
tion with his client and with the public generally. As a
large proportion of the cases involving the accountant's
liability have arisen in the last decade, the subject ap-
pears to be one of growing importance. It should be
borne in mind that the principles herein discussed are
not new law, but are only applications of existing law
to new sets of facts. When, in the future, questions of a
similar nature are presented to the courts for considera-
tion, they will, undoubtedly, in interpreting and applying
the broad principles of the common law, be guided by the
cases already decided on the subject.
